«Original citation: Owen, Geoffrey (2012) Industrial policy in Europe since the Second World War: what has been learnt? ECIPE Occasional paper, 1. ...»
111. One part of the old GEC, the defence electronics business known as Marconi Electronic Systems, was acquired by British Aerospace in 1999 and continues to operate as part of what is now called BAE Systems.
112. David Card, Richard Blundell, and Richard B. Freeman, Seeking a premier economy: the economic effects of British economic reforms 1980-2000, Chicago, 2004, p55.
113. Nicholas Crafts, British relative economic decline revisited, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion paper No 8384, May 2011.
114. Peter Hall, Governing the economy, Polity Press, 1986, p194.
115. Jean-Pierre Brulé, L’Informatique Malade de l’État, Les Belles Lettres, 1993, p 226.
116. Vivien A. Schmidt, From state to market? The transformation of French business and government, Cambridge, 1996, pp124-125.
117. Jonah D. Levy, The return of the state? French economic policy under Nicolas Sarkozy, APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.
118. J. Nicholas Ziegler, Governing ideas: strategies for innovation in France and Germany, Cornell University Press 1997, p182.
119. The French government shareholding (through France Telecom and CEA-Industrie) was later reduced to
13.5 per cent, and the same proportion was held by the Italian government. The rest of the shares were widely held.
120. Alan Cawson, Kevin Morgan, Douglas Webber, Peter Holmes and Anne Stevens, Hostile brothers, competition and closure in the European electronics industry, Oxford, 1990, p285.
121. Usinor Sacilor, later renamed Usinor, was privatised in 1995. After further acquisitions in Belgium and Spain it was renamed Arcelor in 2002.
122. A leading economist, François Morin, warned that privatisation could lead to Renault passing into foreign control. “If one wants to imitate Anglo-Saxon liberalism”, he wrote, “one should be aware of the risk: the British motor industry has completely disappeared and the American car manufacturers are in serious difficulty”. L’Express, June 3, 1993.
123. In 2005 the government reduced its stake to 15 per cent.
124. One of Thomson-CSF’s biggest purchases, in 2000, was that of Racal, a leading British defence electronics company.
125. This merger, which was criticised by some observers as lacking in industrial logic, enabled the government to reduce its stake in Snecma from 62 per cent to 36 per cent.
126. Philippe Mustar and Philippe Laredo, Innovation and research policy in France (1980-2000) or the disappearance of the Colbertist state, Research Policy 31 2002, pp55-72.
127. Jonah D. Levy, The return of the state? French economic policy under Nicolas Sarkozy, APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.
128. Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paqué and Holger Schmieding, The fading miracle, four decades of market economy in Germany, Cambridge, 1992.
129. Christoph F. Büchtemann and Kurt Vogler-Ludwig, The “German model” under pressure, Centre for Research on Innovation and Society, Working Paper, 1998.
130. Horst Siebert and Michael Stolpe, Germany, in Steil et al (eds), Technological innovation and economic performance, Princeton University Press, 2002.
131. Susanne Giesecke, The contrasting roles of government in the development of the biotechnology industry in the US and Germany, Research Policy, 29, 2, February 2000.
132. In 1993 no less than 85.6 per cent of the R & D carried out in the aerospace industry was funded by the government. The corresponding figure for the chemical industry was 1 per cent and for non-electrical machinery 4.3 per cent.
133. One of the strongest advocates of the Japanese model was Konrad Seitz, a former diplomat who wrote a best-selling book on the subject. See Konrad Seitz, The case for a Federal Government high technology policy, Intereconomics, May/June 1992. John Gillingham, European integration 1950-2003, Cambridge 2003, p395.
134. Jeffrey Gordon, Pathways to corporate convergence? Two steps on the road to shareholder capitalism in Germany: Deutsche Telekom and DaimlerChrysler, Columbia Journal of European Law, 5, 219, spring 1999.
135. Sigurt Vitols and Lutz Engelhardt, National institutions and high tech industries: a varieties of capitalism perspective on the failure of Germany’s “Neuer Markt”, Working Paper, WZB, February 2005.
136. Dirk Dohse and Tanja Staehler, BioRegio, BioProfile and the rise of the German biotech industry, Kiel Working Papers No 1456, October 2008.
137. Karen E. Adelberger, Semi-sovereign leadership? The state’s role in German biotechnology and venture capital growth, German Politics, 9, April 2000.
138. Siegfried Bialojan and Julia Schuler, Commercial biotechnology in Germany: an overview, Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 10, 1, September 2003.
139. The UK had seemed in the 1990s to be most likely of the European countries to develop a strong biotechnology industry, but hopes that a core of large, world-class biotechnology companies would emerge have not been fulfilled. A list of the world’s top hundred biotechnology companies in 2010 contained only three British companies and one German; seventy-one of the companies were based in the US. MedAdNews June 2011.
140. Sigurt Vitols and Lutz Engelhardt, National institutions and high tech industries: a varieties of capitalism perspective on the failure of Germany’s “Neuer Markt”, Working Paper WZB February 2005.
141. An important tax change, which took effect in 2002, removed the capital gains tax that had discouraged banks and other financial firms from selling their shares in industrial companies. The effect was to transfer the banks’ shares into the hands of more active investors and “to force inefficient firms to respond to shareholder concerns and to either become competitive or face market disapproval”, John Gillingham, European integration 1950-2003, Cambridge 2003, p395.
142. Study of Siemens by S G Warburg Securities May 1991.
143. In 2009 Siemens sold its half share in this venture to its Japanese partner.
144. A notable case was that of Hoechst, which divested all its chemical businesses in order to focus on pharmaceuticals.
145. One German manager who made a much-publicised commitment to shareholder value was Jürgen Schrempp, chief executive of Daimler-Benz from 1995 to 2005. After taking over the leadership of the company, he divested all its recently acquired non-automotive interests except aerospace. Schrempp was also responsible for the merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, which proved to be an expensive mistake.
146. Raising Germany’s growth potential, Occasional Paper No 28, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, February 2007.
147. Research, innovation and technological performance in Germany, 2008 Report by Expert Commission on Science and Technology.
148. Wayne Sandholtz, High-tech Europe, the politics of international cooperation, University of California Press, 1992, p163.
149. Dimitris Assimakopoulos, Rebecca Marschan-Piekkari and Stuart Macdonald, ESPRIT: Europe’s response to US and Japanese domination in information technology, in Richard Coopey (ed), Information technology policy: an international history, Oxford, 2004.
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150. Erik Arnold and Ken Guy, Parallel convergence: national strategies in information technology, Pinter
1986. An earlier cooperative project was the Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) programme, launched in 1975, which helped to accelerate the development of the Japanese semiconductor industry.
151. Mariko Sakakibara, Evaluating government-sponsored R & D consortia in Japan: who benefits and how?
Research Policy, 26, 1997, pp447-473.
152. BRITE was later combined with EURAM, European Research in Advanced Materials.
153. The current Framework programme, the seventh, runs from 2007 to 2013, and it will be followed by the renamed Horizon 2020 programme. For a history of the Framework programmes, see John Peterson and Margaret Sharp, Technology policy in the European Union, Macmillan Press, 1998.
154. Sandholtz, High-tech Europe, p259.
155. John Gillingham, European integration 1950-2003, Cambridge 2003, p231.
156. Paolo Cecchini, with Michel Catinat and Alexis Jacquemin, The European Challenge 1992, the benefits of a single market, European Commission 1988, p73.
157. John E Richards, Clusters, competition and “global players” in ICT markets: the case of Scandinavia, in Timothy Brenham and Alfonso Gambardella (eds), Building high-tech clusters: Silicon Valley and beyond, Cambridge, 2004.
158. Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM standard: explaining a success story, Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 3, Special Issue 2001, pp432-453.
159. Andre Sapir, Europe’s single market: the long march to 1992, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No 1245, September 1995.
160. European Commission, European Competitiveness Report 1999.
161. Peterson and Sharp, Technology policy in the European Union, pp167-170. See also Élie Cohen, La tentation hexagonale, Fayard 1996, pp292-306.
162. The third of the leading participants, STMicroelectronics, continues to be a major supplier of semiconductor devices. Siemens put its semiconductor operations into a free-standing company, Infineon, in 2000; Philips sold its semiconductor business to a private equity group in 2006.
163. Research after Maastricht: an assessment, a strategy, Communication from the European Commission to the Council and European Parliament, Bulletin supplement 2/92, quoted in Peterson and Sharp, Technology policy in the European Union, p122.
164. An agenda for a growing Europe, The Sapir report, European Commission, 2004.
165. Facing the challenge: the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment, Report from the high level group chaired by Wim Kok, November 2004.
166. OECD Economic Outlook, December 2003, Table 13.
167. Christopher Allen, Didier Herbert, Gert-Jan Koopman, The European Commission’s new industrial policy, EIB Papers 11,2, 2006.
168. This intervention was handled very differently from the British Leyland case; General Motors and Chrysler were forced to make drastic cuts in capacity and in employment, and by 2011 they seemed to be in a healthier financial state, no longer needing government support. Steven Rattner, Overhaul: an insider’s account of the Obama Administration’s emergency rescue of the auto industry, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010.
169. Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih, Restoring American competitiveness, Harvard Business Review, JulyAugust 2009.
170. Andrew Grove, How to make an American job, Bloomberg Businessweek, July 5-11, 2010. Andrew Liveris, Make it in America: the case for reinventing the economy, John Wiley, 2011.
171. Michael Spence, The next convergence: the future of economic growth in a multi-speed world, Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 2011 p262.
172. See, for example, Lionel Fontagné and Jean-Hervé Lorenzi, Désindustrialisation, délocalisations, Conseil d’Analyse Économique, 2005.
173. Jean-Louis Beffa, Pour une nouvelle politique industrielle, January 2005.
174. Emmanuel Muller, Andrea Zenker and Jean-Alain Héraud, France: innovation system and innovation policy, Fraunhofer ISI Discussion Paper, April 2009.
175. OECD Economic Surveys France 2009. See also Gilles Duranton, Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer and Florian Mayneris, The economics of clusters, lessons from the French experience, Oxford, 2010.
176. Financial Times, October 24, 2008.
177. Private communication.
178. Jonah D. Levy, The return of the state? French economic policy under Nicolas Sarkozy, APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.
179. Sir John Rose, “Why manufacturing matters”, Gabor lecture at Imperial College, November 15, 2007.
180. Peter Mandelson, The third man, life at the heart of New Labour, HarperCollins 2010, pp456-7.
181. Financial Times January 15, 2010.
182. Developing UK industrial policy, lessons from France, Trades Union Congress, December 2009.
183. New Industry, New Jobs, Building Britain’s Future, Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, April 2009. Later in 2009 BERR was merged with the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills to form the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.
184. New Industry, New Jobs – one year on, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, March 2010.
185. Vince Cable, Speech at Cass Business School, June 3, 2010.
186. Vince Cable, Speech at Policy Exchange, October 26, 2011.
187. A lead market initiative for Europe, European Commission, December 21, 2007.
188. Karl Aiginger and Susanne Sieber, The matrix approach to industrial policy, International Review of Applied Economics, 20, 5, pp573-603.
189. OECD Economic Surveys: European Union, OECD 2009.
190. European Commission, Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 2011, p357.
191. David Encaoua, Nature of the European technology gap: creative destruction or industrial policy? In Dominique Foray (ed), The new economics of technology policy, Edward Elgar, 2009.
192. Philippe Aghion, Julian Boulanger and Elie Cohen, Rethinking industrial policy, Bruegel Policy Brief, June
2011. See also Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Liqun Du, Ann Harrison and Patrick Legros, Industrial policy and competition, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 8619, November 2011.
193. Ha-Joon Chang, Industrial policy in East Asia – lessons for Europe, European Investment Bank Papers, Vol 2, 2006.
194. When the Franco-German search engine project, Quaero, was launched in 2005, it was described by one supporter as a potential Airbus of the internet, Financial Times, July 30 2006.
195. Speech by Jacques Chirac. January 18, 2005.
196. Damien Neven and Paul Seabright, European industrial policy: the Airbus case, Economic Policy, 21 October 1995.
197. Paul Seabright, National and European champions – burden or blessing? CESifo Forum 2/2005.
198. Mariana Mazzucato, The entrepreneurial state, Demos, 2011.
199. The Technology Strategy Board, a government agency that provides grants for innovative projects in industry, was set up in 2007, replacing what had been an advisory body within the Department of Trade and Industry.
200. David C. Mowery and Richard R. Nelson, Explaining industrial leadership, in Mowery and Nelson (eds), Sources of industrial leadership: studies of seven industries, Cambridge, 1999.
201. Jorge Niosi, Complexity and path dependence in biotechnology innovation systems, Industrial and Corporate Change, 20, 6, pp1795-1826.
202. Shane Greenstein, Nurturing the accumulation of innovations: lessons from the internet, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15905, April 2010.
203. Iain M. Cockburn and Scott Stern, Finding the endless frontier: lessons from the life sciences innovation system for technology policy, Capitalism and Society 5, 1, 2010.
204. Financial Times June 8 2011.