«Original citation: Owen, Geoffrey (2012) Industrial policy in Europe since the Second World War: what has been learnt? ECIPE Occasional paper, 1. ...»
a case study, in Charles Carter (ed), Industrial policy and innovation.
41. The steel industry was an outstanding example, although the British Steel Corporation’s problems in the late 1970s stemmed in part from the unwise expansion of capacity that had taken place under a Conservative government earlier in the decade.
42. “Industry officials and outsiders seem to be in agreement on one central point: the fact that Renault belongs to the government has not significantly affected its market behaviour”, John Sheahan, Promotion and control of industry in post-war France, Harvard, 1963, p117.
43. François Chesnais, The French national system of innovation, in Richard R. Nelson (ed), National innovation systems, a comparative analysis, Oxford, 1993.
44. Peter Hall, Governing the economy, Polity Press, 1986, p167.
45. Walter A McDougall, Space-age Europe: Gaullism, Euro-Gaullism, and the American dilemma, Technology and Culture, 26, 2 April 1985 pp179-203.
46. Christian Stoffaës, Industrial policy in the high-technology industries, in William J. Adams and Christian Stoffaës (eds), French industrial policy, Brookings, 1986.
47. “Without France, the European commitment (to space) would not be of the scale it now is, nor Arianespace a viable competitor of the main US launchers.” François Chesnais, The French national system of innovation, in Richard R. Nelson (ed), National innovation systems, Oxford, 1993.
48. Pierre E. Mounier-Kuhn, Rappel sur les origines du Plan Calcul, in Entre Plan Calcul et Unidata, Institut d’Histoire de l’Industrie, Éditions Rive Droite, 1998.
49. John Zysman, Political strategies for industrial order: state, market and industry in France, University of California Press, 1977, pp74-77.
50. J. Nicholas Ziegler, Governing ideas: strategies for innovation in France and Germany, Cornell University Press 1997, p170.
51. Ếlie Cohen, France: national champions in search of a mission, in Jack Hayward (ed), Industrial enterprise and European integration, Oxford, 1995.
52. Alan Cawson, Kevin Morgan, Douglas Webber, Peter Holmes and Anne Stevens, Hostile brothers, competition and closure in the European electronics industry, Oxford, 1990, p265.
53. Graduates of France’s most prestigious graduate school, École Nationale d’Administration.
54. Robin Cowan, Nuclear power reactors: a study in technological lock-in, Journal of Economic History, 50, 3, September 1990.. See also Dominique Fino and Carine Staropoli, Institutional and technological coevolution in the French electronuclear industry, Industry and Innovation 8, 2 August 2001.
55. Andrew Jack, The French exception, Profile Books, 1999, p85.
56. Jean-Pierre Brulé, L’Informatique Malade de l’État, Les Belles Lettres,1993, p147.
57. Peter Hall, Governing the economy, Polity Press, 1986, pp186-7.
58. J. Nicholas Ziegler, Governing ideas: strategies for innovation in France and Germany, Cornell University Press 1997, p41. In planning this project the Direction Générale des Télécommunications (DGT) sought to encourage competition with Alcatel by arranging for Thomson to re-enter the industry; with the DGT’s encouragement, Thomson acquired control of the French subsidiaries of Ericsson and ITT.
59. By contrast the Minitel, planned and financed by the Direction Générale des Télécommunications (DGT), is generally regarded as a failure, and one which delayed the take-up of the Internet in France. One of the reasons for the failure was the DGT’s desire to make Minitel a completely French instrument, ignoring the huge international potential of telecom-related activities in both hardware and software. See Patrick Messerlin, France, in Benn Steil, David G. Victor and Richard R. Nelson (eds), Technological Innovation and Economic Performance, Princeton University Press, 2002.
60. Peter Hall, Governing the economy, Polity Press, 1986, p191.
61. For an account of these events, see Jean-Pierre Brulé, L’Informatique Malade de l’État, Les Belles Lettres,1993.
62. Pierre Sicsic and Charles Wyplosz, France 1945-1992, in Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds), Economic growth in Europe since 1945, Cambridge 1996. See also Patrick Messerlin, France, in Steil, Victor and Nelson (eds), Technological innovation and economic performance, Princeton University Press, 2002.
63. Jean-Louis Loubet, Automobiles Peugeot, une réussite industrielle 1945-1974, Economica 1990, p352.
64. The machine tool industry consisted mainly of small and medium-sized firms and did not lend itself to the top-down policies, including the promotion of mergers and state-supported research programmes, favoured by the French authorities. J. Nicholas Ziegler, Governing ideas: strategies for innovation in France and Germany, Cornell University Press 1997, p153.
65. Henry Ergas, The importance of technology policy, in Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman (eds), Economic policy and technological performance, Cambridge 1987.
66. In contrast to the French success in telecommunications, the introduction of digital exchanges into the British telephone system was hampered by commercial rivalries and an unclear division of responsibilities between the operator (the Post Office, later British Telecom) and its principal suppliers. One consequence was that GEC, the principal UK manufacturer, lost ground in export markets. Cawson et al, Hostile brothers, pp106-113.
67. Heidrun Abromeit, Government-industry relations in West Germany, in Martin Chick (ed) Governments, industries and markets, Edward Elgar, 1990.
68. This was a case where the social and political strains arising from a precipitate run-down of the coal
mines were deemed unacceptable, see Martin F. Parnell, The German tradition of organised capitalism:
self-government in the coal industry, Oxford, 1994.
69. H Norman Abramson et al, Technology transfer systems in the United States and Germany, National academy press,1997, pp320-332.
70. Henry Ergas, The importance of technology policy, in Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman (eds), Economic policy and technological performance, Cambridge, 1987.
71. Gary Herrigel, Industrial constructions, the sources of German industrial power, Cambridge, 1996, p181.
72. When Volkswagen ran into a severe financial crisis in 1974-75, the Federal government, which was then the largest shareholder, used its influence to bring in a new chairman and a new managing director, but there was no financial support from the government and no government involvement in the company’s subsequent recovery. Steven Tolliday, From “Beetle monoculture” to the “German model”: the transformation of Volkswagen 1967-1991, Business and Economic History 24, 2 winter 1995.
73. Kenneth Flamm, Creating the computer, Brookings, 1988, pp163-4.
74. Otto Keck, A theory of white elephants: asymmetric information in government support for technology, Research Policy 17 (1988) pp187-201.
75. Otto Keck, The national system for technical innovation in Germany, in Richard R Nelson (ed), National innovation systems, a comparative analysis, Oxford, 1993.
76. Margaret Sharp and Claire Shearman, European technological cooperation, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, pp28-33. In scientific research, some trans-European institutions were set up in the early post-war decades, of which the most successful was CERN (The European Organisation for Nuclear Research).
CERN, the world’s largest particle physics laboratory, has remained outside the purview of the European Commission.
77. Eda Kranakis, Politics, business and European information technology policy: from the Treaty of Rome to Unidata, 1958-1975, in Richard Coopey (ed), Information technology policy: an international history, Oxford 2004, pp209-246.
78. John W. Young, Technological cooperation in Wilson’s strategy for the EEC, in Oliver J Daddow (ed), Harold Wilson and European integration, Frank Cass, 2003.
79. N. H. Aked and P. J. Gummett, Science and technology in the European communities: the history of the COST projects, Research Policy, 5 (1976) pp270-294.
80. Keith Pavitt, Technology in Europe’s future, Research Policy Vol 1 (1971/1972) p266.
81. McDougall, Space Age Europe. This author notes that in Britain “budgetary pressures and bungling seemed always to prevent a coherent policy on the French model. Officials responsible for space suffered from a bureaucratic minuet that shifted them among nine different ministries over the space of a decade.
Having cancelled its national missile programs, the British government revived scientific rocket research in 1964 and finally launched a single, home-made satellite on the Black Knight booster in 1971. After 1957 the British depended on the United States for strategic missiles and were the most willing to rely on NASA for access to space, earning them in European space councils the epithet ‘the delegates from America’”.
82. Industrial Policy in the Community: memorandum from the Commission to the Council, European Commission 1970.
83. Alan Butt Philip, European industrial policies: an overview, in Graham Hall (ed), European industrial policy, Croom Helm 1986. See also Stephen Woolcock, Information technology: the challenge to Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies, 22, 4, June 1984.
84. Quoted in “The Community’s industrial policy”, Commission of the European Communities, February, 1979.
85. Angus Maddison, The world economy, a millennial perspective, OECD 2001, Table E-9.
86. Structural adjustment and economic performance, OECD 1987, p234.
87. Henry Ergas, Europe’s policy for high technology: has anything been learnt? OECD, Paris, 1993.
88. Rose Marie Ham and David C Mowery, Enduring dilemmas in US technology policy, California Management Review, 37, 4 summer 1995.
89. Richard R. Nelson, Institutions supporting technical change in the US, in Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerard Silverberg and Luc Soete (eds), Technical change and economic theory, Pinter 1988. A later example of US government intervention in civilian technology was the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC), established in 1980 in the hope of creating a domestic synthetic fuel industry and thus reducing the country’s dependence on oil imports. The subsequent fall in oil prices undermined the rationale of the SFC and it was closed down in 1986 after several billions of dollars had been spent.
90. Richard R. Nelson, High-technology policies, a five-nation comparison, American Enterprise Institute, 1984, pp54-55.
91. An influential early appraisal of Japanese industrial policy was Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese miracle, Stanford University Press, 1982.
92. Martin Fransman, Japan’s computer and communications industry, Oxford, 1995, p22. See also Marie Anchordoguy, Mastering the market: Japanese government targeting of the computer industry, International organisation, 42, 3, summer 1988 pp509-543.
93. See for example Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich, Minding America’s business, Random House, 1983, and Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Who’s bashing whom? Trade conflict in high-technology industries, Institute for International economics, 1992.
94. Richard N. Langlois, Computers and semiconductors, in Benn Steil, David G. Victor and Richard R. Nelson (eds), Technological Innovation and Economic Performance, Princeton University Press, 2002.
95. Jeffrey T. Macher, David C. Mowery and David A. Hodges, Semiconductors, in David C. Mowery (ed), US industry in 2000, studies in competitive performance, National Academy Press, 1999.
96. For a sceptical view, see Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, Industrial policy in an era of globalisation:
lessons from Asia, Institute for International Economics, Washington, March 2003.
97. Robert J. Gordon, Why was Europe left at the station when America’s locomotive departed? Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper 4416, June 2004.
98. British Telecom had been part of the Post Office but was established as a separate corporation in 1981.
99. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street years, HarperCollins, 1993, p118.
100. The Rover/British Aerospace deal, which took place in 1987, was not arranged by the government but it was politically convenient because the buyer was British; it was announced at a press conference within the Department of Trade and Industry. There was no logic to the merger and it was not long before British Aerospace began looking for a buyer.
101. Suma Athreye, The Cambridge high-tech cluster, in Timothy Bresnahan and Alfonso Gambardella (eds), Building high-tech clusters: Silicon Valley and beyond, Cambridge, 2004.
102. Brian Oakley and Kenneth Owen, Alvey, Britain’s strategic computing initiative, MIT Press, 1989.
103. Colin Wren, Industrial subsidies, the UK experience, Macmillan, 1996, p161.
104. Martin Campbell-Kelly, ICL a business and technical history, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p189, pp336-7.
105. Fujitsu later bought full control of ICL, and in 2001 the ICL name was dropped.
106. Alan Cawson, Kevin Morgan, Douglas Webber, Peter Holmes and Anne Stevens, Hostile brothers, competition and closure in the European electronics industry, Oxford, 1990, p251.
107. William Walker, National innovation systems: Britain, in Richard R. Nelson (ed), National Innovation Systems, Oxford, 1993.
108. Our competitive future: building the knowledge-driven economy, Cmd 4176 December 1998.
109. Dan Corry, Anna Valero, and John Van Reenen, UK economic performance since 1997: growth, producti
vity and jobs, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, November 2011.
110. Among the companies that passed into foreign control was Celltech, bought by UCB of Belgium in 2004; Celltech had been regarded as the flagship of the British biotechnology industry.