«Building and Rebuilding Trust with Promises and Apologies Eric Schniter and Roman Sheremeta and Daniel Sznycer Online at ...»
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Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment. You will receive $7 for participating in this session. You may also receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired.
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.
First, by choosing a dollar amount from $0 to $20, B indicates the proportion of a possible $20 income that
he or she promises to transfer back to A, should A choose IN. Specifically, B will complete the following statement:
“I (Participant B) promise to transfer back ___ of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose IN”. The computer will convey B’s statement to A, and then A and B will proceed as described below. B may still choose an amount to transfer back to A that is different than the amount promised.
Having received a statement from B, A indicates whether he or she chooses IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A receives $5 and B receives $0. If A chooses IN, then B receives $20 income. In such a case, after receiving $20 income, B must choose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 to transfer back to A.
The same decision tasks that were just completed will be repeated again, with everyone remaining in the same A or B roles and paired with the same participants as in the previous tasks.
Prior to repetition of the previous decision tasks, B has an option to send a message to A. B may use a text box to type a message, if desired. We will allow time as needed to construct and type messages. When B’s message has been completed (by typing in the text box and clicking on the send button) it will be conveyed by the computer to the appropriate Participant A, and then A and B will proceed with decision tasks. In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance. Other than these restrictions, B may say anything in the message. If you wish not to send a message, simply click on the send button without having typed anything in the message box.
DECISION TASKS AND SURVEY (REPEATED AS BEFORE)This second set of decision tasks and the accompanying 20 item survey is the final part of the experiment.
There will be no further tasks.